AD-A264 434

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.

PEACEKEEPING AND PRINCIPLES OF OPERATIONAL WARFARE:
THE U.S. AND MNF IN LEBANON 1983-4

by

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A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in
partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views, and are not
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The focus of study is the usefulness of employing the concepts, principles and methodologies of the operational level of war as a framework for thinking about employment of military forces as a tool of policy in peacekeeping. Peacekeeping operations are defined from official military publications, emphasizing the limitations on the use of the military instrument to enable political-diplomatic efforts to succeed. The relationship of Peacekeeping to other types of Low Intensity Conflict, and the difficulty of actually conducting an operation which fits neatly into the official definition without involving other mission areas, are also brought out.

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Abstract of

PEACEKEEPING AND PRINCIPLES OF OPERATIONAL WARFARE: THE U.S. AND MNF IN LEBANON 1983-4

The focus of the study is the usefulness of employing the concepts, principles and methodologies of the operational level of war as a framework for thinking about employment of military forces as a tool of policy in peacekeeping. Peacekeeping operations are defined from official military publications, emphasizing the limitations on the use of the military instrument to enable political-diplomatic efforts to succeed. The relationship of Peacekeeping to other types of Low Intensity Conflict, and the difficulty of actually conducting an operation which fits neatly into the official definition without involving other mission areas, are also brought out.

The question of whether the military aspects of Peacekeeping operations fit into the official definitions of the operational level of war is also addressed in the affirmative. Since they do, is it appropriate to apply the operational art, operational concepts, and the principles of war to peacekeeping? Since the operational concepts and principles are supposed to provide a framework for thinking about employment of military forces to the unique circumstances of every war, can they be similarly applied to the use of military forces in each unique peacekeeping situation?

The experience of the U.S. and MNF in Lebanon in 1983-84 is used as a case study to examine this proposal. In many instances during that operation, the principles and concepts were not effectively employed, particularly in mission and objectives definition and unity of command and effort. The difficulties of conducting peacekeeping operations are illustrated, such as defining mission and objectives, flexibility in planning for changing circumstances, the need for coordination with other instruments of national policy. Eventually, some of the principles of peacekeeping itself were violated, leading to a change in circumstances which was not adequately addressed in the military part of the peacemaking effort.

The use of operational concepts an principles could perhaps have avoided same of the errors made, saved lives, and enhanced the utility of the military aspect in the overall peacemaking effort, although the circumstances in Lebanon probably would probably have undermined ultimate success due to lack of success in the political and diplomatic efforts.

The conclusion is that the use of the military in peacekeeping operations can be enhanced by employing an operational framework and the principles of war to thinking about, planning and executing its employment. The hoped for result will better use of the military with the other tools of national power in peacemaking endeavors.

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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Individual nations, coalitions of states, and more recently international organizations have been undertaking and conducting peacekeeping efforts, both diplomatic and military, for centuries. In today's multipolar and unstable international environment both the requirements for, and the opportunities to effectively conduct, peacekeeping operations have arguably increased. This raises the likelihood that U.S. military forces - unilaterally, in ad hoc coalition, or as part of international organizations or alliances - will be called upon to perform peacekeeping functions.

From practical experience, the U.S. military has developed a body of concepts, principles and methodologies for the conduct of war, and specifically for the conduct of war at the operational level. These are intended to provide a framework for thinking about the organization and employment of military forces as a tool of national policy. This framework serves as a general guideline for application in the unique circumstances of every war, so that military forces can be used as effectively as possible and with the highest probability of success. The question which will be examined here is whether that framework can also be applied to the use of military forces in peacekeeping operations.

What is a peacekeeping operation, and what is the proper military role in it? Are peacekeeping operations properly classified within the operational level of war? If so, how can military commanders best consider organization and employment of forces in that role, as opposed to more traditional war making? U.S. military doctrine provides some definitions and considerations for peacekeeping, but are these adequate? Are peacekeeping operations really as neat and clean and separate as the definitions indicate, or is peacekeeping more likely to be melded with other types of operations, either simultaneously or sequentially? If so, how might that affect the way military 'peace operations' should be thought about, planned and executed?

The involvement of U.S. and Multinational forces in Lebanon in 1983-84 provide an example of one type of "peace operations" which may be encountered in the future. What lessons, if any, does it provide concerning the nature of peace operations and the successful or unsuccessful employment of the military in them? Against this historical backdrop, the operational framework will be applied. Were operational concepts and the principles of war applied in Lebanon, and if so how well? Could their use, or better application, have avoided the some of the military setbacks suffered?

Lebanon was a unique situation, and some of the specific lessons learned there may or

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may not apply in future peace operations. However, in examining the case of Lebanon perhaps some light can be shed on the larger questions. Are there unique aspects to peace operations that make the use of the operational warfare framework and principles of war inappropriate when considering how to employ military forces in them? Alternatively, might the operational framework provide a useful set of guidelines for thinking about the application of the military in each unique peacekeeping situation, as it should in each unique war? Could its use contribute to more effective planning and execution of peace operations?

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CHAPTER II
PEACEKEEPING, CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES

What is Peacekeeping?

Before considering whether operational concepts and the principles of war can be applied in peacekeeping, that term must first be clarified. Just what is a 'peacekeeping' operation? From review of official and unofficial literature(1) a usable definition can be obtained. Military peacekeeping operations are grouped within the spectrum of conflict as one of many types of Low Intensity Conflict. They are military operations which support diplomatic efforts to achieve or maintain peace in areas of potential or actual conflict through supervision, implementation or maintenance of a negotiated truce. They are conducted with the consent of the belligerent parties, usually after negotiations establish a mandate for their presence.

The mandate is the peacekeeping force's authority to act. It typically identifies the participating nations and determines the size and type of force each contributes, as well as defining the force's scope of operations, including constraints and restrictions. A major distinguishing feature of peacekeeping operations is that the force is normally forbidden to use violence to accomplish its mission except in self-defense. Above all, the peacekeeping force must remain neutral in the eyes of both the belligerents and other interested parties in the international community by maintaining a balanced approach and the trust of the parties involved.

This is a very neat, very clean definition. It would be ideal if a military commander were confronted with a situation where all these pre-conditions were met, he could select, organize and employ his forces accordingly, and he could easily maintain neutrality through a balanced approach and use of force only in self defense. The difficulty which is likely to confront a military commander is that, as in the past, operations characteriz l as "peacekeeping" have not fitted snugly into this well-defined hole.

For example, what if *all* interested parties have not agreed to the presence of the peacekeeping force? The joint staff has attempted to address this in doctrine by severely restricting those operations which can be defined as peacekeeping. The limiting condition is the consent of *all* parties involved. If such consent is not given, or is limited, "the operation is not a peacekeeping operation...[and] would be termed a *peacemaking* operation"(2), which fall. into the category of peacetime contingency operations. Peacetime contingency operations are "undertaken in crisis avoidance or crisis management situations requiring the use of the military instrument to enforce or support diplomatic initiatives."(3) The

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implication here is that political, diplomatic or economic instruments either cannot be effective to prevent unwanted results in a timely fashion, or have failed to influence the parties (or adversary) involved in the dispute. Peacemaking operations, specifically, "are conducted to stop a violent conflict and to force a return to political and diplomatic methods. They are typically undertaken at the request of appropriate authorities in a ... state [and] may be conducted in cooperation with other countries or unilaterally."(4)

Definition Ambiguities in the Real World

These differences in definition, and the doctrine which has now been developed to support them, can be useful to the operational commander. However, this is true only if the mission is defined appropriately. If conditions or goals are misunderstood or misinterpreted within the chain of command, it may result in improper use of the military instrument. This paper will examine an operation in Lebanon, undertaken before the development of current doctrine, which may have been poorly defined. But even with new clarity in doctrine, how can military commanders account for ambiguous definition of goals and missions in complex situations? Specifically for those defined as peacekeeping, how can commanders account for the possibility that the conditions under which a force was established might change over time? How can mission success be optimized in situations where the peacekeeping forces may not remain impartial in the eyes of belligerents, particularly if their presence comes to be seen as contributing to requirements for belligerents to concede points at the bargaining table? How can threats to mission success be minimized given the possibility that belligerents may not come to a negotiated peace and choose to resume hostilities, thus threatening the force?

Another challenge likely to be encountered by military commanders are LIC operations which include more than one of the separately defined missions within that broad concept, either concurrently or sequentially. Operation Restore Hope in Somalia is a current example. The overall mission is humanitarian (or disaster) relief, but in the context of lawlessness and lack of recognized central authority in that unfortunate nation the military forces there could also appropriately be said to be conducting concurrent peacekeeping (or peacemaking), nation assistance, counter terrorism, show of force, strike/raid, and non-combatant evacuation operations. Situations have occurred, and may arise again, where peacemaking operations transition to peacekeeping operations, or where peacekeeping operations become peacemaking operations after a breakdown of negotiations.

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Operational Concepts and Principles - Can They Help?

Perhaps in all of these ambiguous situations the application operational design concepts and the principles of war can assist commanders with objective identification of conditions and requirements for success. For the purposes of this study, the principles of war which will be considered are objective, unity of command, offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver, security, surprise and simplicity. The key concepts of operational design are centers of gravity, culminating points and lines of operation. A basic understanding of these principles and concepts is assumed. Although not all of them will be addressed in detail, some specific definitions(5) will be expanded upon in the course of the case study, as well as in the final section concerning potential for their general application in peacekeeping.

One basic point which must be stressed is that all of the principles and concepts are interrelated. Their use involves consideration of tradeoffs among them and how they can be usefully applied to specific situations. Not every one may be applicable or valuable to the same degree. They are not useful as a checklist, but "as a framework for thinking about those situations - as a set of military planning interrogatives - a set of questions to be considered if the military instrument is to best serve the national interest."(6) Is this not the operational art - the employment of military force to attain strategic goals through the design, organization and conduct of major campaigns and operations - the fundamental decisions about what the objectives are and when, where and how to employ his forces to attain them?

Is Peacekeeping at the Operational Level?

The principles of war, operational concepts, and the operational art can be applied at all levels of war. The intent of this paper is to examine their application at the operational level. Hence it is reasonable to ask whether peacekeeping is conducted at the operational level. JCS Test Pub 3.0 defines the operational level of war as:

> "The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or areas of operation. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to accomplish strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, and initiating actions and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events."(7)

As defined, military peacekeeping operations appear to fit in the operational level, in that military forces are being applied to achievement of strategic goals. However, military operations form only a part of the overall peacekeeping effort. In all Low Intensity Conflict operations, and particularly in peacekeeping, the military instrument must be closely

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coordinated with and support other elements of national or international power - political, diplomatic and economic. It might be argued the overall military peacekeeping mission resides at the strategic level with a theater CINC, who is responsible for ensuring coordination of military operations with the other tools of national power within his area of responsibility. It should be the CINC, in coordination with the NCA and other government agencies within his theater, who defines the overall strategic goal, the mission of the peacekeeping force, its basic composition, its commander, its relationships to the representatives of other instruments of national power, and the conditions of its employment.

However, the actual *employment* of the peacekeeping force will most likely be delegated to a subordinate commander. It is that commander, working from the theater strategic direction, who will establish operational objectives, devise the detailed plan of operations and sustainment, attempt to sequence events to contribute to the strategic goals, and conduct the operation. It is that commander who is functioning primarily at the operational level.

Even so, there is difficulty. Can a military peacekeeping force, in and of itself, accomplish the strategic objective - peace? It is merely a device to enable diplomatic negotiations toward peace to proceed in an environment where active conflict is absent or greatly reduced. Thus peacekeeping as a military endeavor would appear to be fundamentally different from military operations in war, or even in other types of low intensity conflict. The achievement of operational objectives would not, at first examination, appear to able to attain the strategic goal. Even if successful in minimization of armed conflict, they cannot resolve the underlying causes of the dispute. There have even been suggestions that the use of peacekeeping forces has, in many instances, actually inhibited negotiation by removing pressures of time or cost on the parties involved, leading to hardening of positions and stagnation.(8)

To some extent the above is a semantic exercise. Although a theater of war CINC does indeed function at the strategic level, both he and his designate theater of operations or operational commander function at the operational level. Also, military forces involved in peacekeeping operations are being applied to attain a strategic goal, even if they cannot accomplish it alone and regardless of their effect on its accomplishment. In the ultimate, the strategic objective even of war is peace under different but stable conditions, and all elements of national power are employed. The major difference is that in war the balance of contribution is weighted toward military action. In peacekeeping it is weighted to diplomacy, and the prime contribution of military force is one of stability and deterrence.

CHAPTER III
CASE STUDY - THE MNF IN LEBANON

Situation and Goals

On 10 September 1982 the final units of the first Multinational Force (MNF), consisting of French and Italian forces and the 32nd MAU, withdrew from Lebanon after successful evacuation of over 1500 Palestinian and Syrian fighters from Beirut, where they had been surrounded by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). This was the culmination of a successful diplomatic and military effort to avoid an all-out battle for the Lebanese capital, which included agreement on the formation of a government of national reconciliation to be led by Bashir Gemayel.

On 14 September, Bashir Gemayel was assassinated. This was followed by IDF occupation of West Beirut on 15 September and the massacre of Palestinian and Lebanese Shiite Muslim civilians in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps by radical Christian Phalange elements on 16 and 18 September. Under the threat of renewed factional fighting, and recognizing that it could not control Beirut and was at risk of dissolving, the nascent government and its newly designated president Amin Gemayel urgently requested re-insertion of the MNF to "ensure the safety of the population of west Beirut until the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) were able to undertake this mission {and} facilitate the withdrawal of Israeli force from Beirut to the south and east."(1)

U.S. special ambassador Philip Habib, the governments of France, Italy, Israel and the Government of Lebanon (GOL) immediately began negotiations on the mandate, terms and missions of the proposed force. The MARG and the 32nd MAU were ordered to return to the Eastern Mediterranean to await further orders.

The utility of operational concepts and principles of war is in their application as a framework and set of interrogatives for considering how to employ available military forces in a particular situation to contribute to achievement of strategic goals. U.S. strategic goals in Lebanon were relatively clear - a sovereign and and independent Lebanon, dedicated to national unity and able to exercise control throughout its territory; the withdrawal of all external forces and reconciliation without foreign interference, and the security of Israel's northern border. The primary means to achieve those goals would be political and diplomatic. The overall function of the MNF was as an adjunct to diplomacy. Its mission was to provide an international presence in order to symbolize support for the GOL; assist the GOL in asserting sovereignty and authority in the Beirut area; provide stability, confidence and security for the GOL and Lebanese people in the Beirut area; and allow

breathing space for negotiations toward reconciliation and withdrawal of foreign forces. The keys were seen as presence to provide stability and security for key sectors of Beirut. The MNF was not to be a long term presence, and was not designed to achieve the long term goals. It was not to be directed against any group, was not intended as a combat force, and was not introduced to compel withdrawal or reconciliation. (2)

Was this Peacekeeping?

Was this a "peacekeeping" operation, as it is now defined? Certainly it was intended that way, and at least in the beginning met most of the requirements. The MNF II was a military operation supporting diplomatic efforts to achieve or maintain peace in an areas of conflict. By 26 September, agreement on a cease fire among the GOL and the various confessional militias had been obtained, so the MNF would, at least in the Beirut area, provide supervision, implementation or maintenance of a negotiated truce. Before it was deployed, negotiations which included the GOL, Israel and the MNF contributors had established the zones the MNF would occupy, and the major militia leaders had accepted their presence. So, for the most part, the operation would be conducted with the consent of the belligerents and other interested parties under a mandate. The MNF was to remain neutral, and was not to use force except in self defense. The the USMNF would occupy positions in the vicinity of Beirut International Airport (BIA), with the Italians to their north in the southern portion of the city (which included the refugee camps), and the French in the urban areas of west Beirut. The Israelis would pull back to south of the Old Sidon road, south of BIA, but remained in positions in the Shouf hills east of BIA.

However, not all conditions for the strict definition of "peacekeeping" were met. Significant interested parties, particularly Syria, which occupied a large portion of Lebanon, were not included in the mandate negotiations. Neither was the PLO. There were also smaller radical political entities, supported by Syria or Iran or both, which did not participate, and did not necessarily agree with all aspects of the MNF's mission or with the nationalities of the forces to be used. These facts did not necessarily doom the MNF or the peacekeeping process at the outset. The Syrians appeared willing to accept a temporary presence as long as their interests in Lebanon were addressed in further reconciliation, force withdrawal and security negotiations. Both they and other factions supported by Iran were concerned with minimizing Israeli and western influences in Lebanon and maximizing their own.

The MNF was requested by the GOL, and one of its primary missions, in addition to peacekeeping, was to support that interim government and assist in the reconstitution of the multi-confessional Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) by providing equipment and training. The primary military responsibility for stability and security in the Beirut area was to be gradually

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transferred to the LAF as they increased their capability. These conditions fit more precisely into the definition of a peacemaking operation. "From the moment they landed, the MNF's status could not be considered completely impartial. . .its mandate. . .made clear that each contingent was bound to assist in the restoration of the GOL's sovereignty and cooperate with the LAF."(3) The USMNF position was seen as the least challenging of the three in terms of threat. But one significant aspect of that position was that it involved another mission. BIA was seen as a vital lifeline for the GOL, and its continued operations an important symbol of stability.(4) Therefore, continued operation of BIA, under conditions as "normal" as possible, was considered one of the implied tasks of the USMNF.

The Changing Environment

The question was whether the MNF could remain neutral if the diplomatic process did not include, and consider the interests of, all concerned parties. To the extent that the interim GOL remained legitimate and the LAF a balanced unifying force in the eyes of the various factions and interested outside parties, conditions would not necessarily negate the imperative for the MNF, as a peacekeeping force, to remain neutral and apply a balanced approach. At the beginning of the operation this was for the most part true. The problem was that it did not remain so.

Between January and March of 1983, the MNF as a whole and the USMNF in particular increasingly began to come under attack from the various militia forces and terrorist groups. On 18 April, the U.S. Embassy was destroyed by a pickup truck carrying high explosives. Embassy functions were moved to the British embassy, security measures were increased, and the ROE for USMNF forces guarding it were adjusted to allow preventive self-defense against terrorist attack. On 17 May the GOL entered into a separate agreement with Israel on withdrawal of forces and security arrangement - an agreement opposed by Syria and many of the other factions. Negotiations toward reconstitution of a permanent government stalled over confessional power sharing. Increasingly, the GOL/LAF became seen not as a potential unifying force, but as another militia aligned with Israel and the Christian factions.

As this situation developed, the MNF missions of peacekeeping and support for the GOL/LAF rapidly became mutually exclusive. However, working from its original mandate and the continuing political goal of support for the GOL, the USMNF began joint patrols with the LAF for the first time in June. With the anticipated withdrawal of the IDF from the Shouf hills overlooking BIA, the cease fire broke down and heavy fighting ensued which spilled over into USMNF positions. The Druze party announced on 23 July the formation of a "National Salvation Front" backed by Syria and opposed to the 17 May Israeli-GOL

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agreement, effectively ending even the facade that the interim GOL was considered a legitimate unifying body. "By mid to late August, Druze, Shia and Syrian leaders had begun making statements to the effect that the multinational forces, especially the U.S. element, was part of the enemy."(5) On August 28, The USMNF began returning artillery fire in self-defense for the first time, and continued to do so. Although this was not inconsistent with their peacekeeping mission, it did not improve the view of their neutrality among the Druze and Shiite militias.

As these "new factors began to emerge. . . the MNF continued to operate on the same mandate."(6) The overall goal and the MNF mission did not evolve with the situation as their neutrality eroded. The question to be examined is how this situation was handled at the operational level - particularly with regard to the mission definition key to consideration of operational requirements by MNF military commanders. How well were operational concepts and principles of war applied, and could better application have improved operational performance in this situation?

On 4 September, the IDF withdrew from the Alayh and Shouf districts. The LAF was unprepared to move into these positions immediately, but began advancing toward the Shouf hills. When the Christian LF militia, which had been supported by the Israelis, was routed by the Druze in the Shouf, the LAF determined it was necessary to occupy Suq-Al Gharb to avoid having the Druze control all the high ground overlooking the MNF positions at BIA. The USMNF positions continued to be subjected to constant indirect fire attacks and continued to respond with counter-battery fire in self defense. F-14 TARPS missions were conducted for the first time on 8 September to provide location of militia artillery positions in support of the USMNF. On 12 September the U.S. NCA decided that successful defense of Suq-Al-Gharb by the LAF was critical to the safety of USMNF positions, and authorized naval gunfire support for the LAF, further aligning the U.S. with them against the Druze and Shia supported by Syria. The U.S. also began emergency arms shipments to the LAF.

By 25 September a new cease fire was instituted. On 1 October, the Druze party announced a separate administration for the Shouf and called for defection of all Druze from the LAF, further weakening its multi-confessional character. However, on 14 October the leaders of all key factions agreed to a new round of reconciliation talks in Geneva. Although the cease fire officially held through mid October, factional clashes continued and intensified, as did small arms attacks on the MNF positions. On 19 October several Marines were killed on patrol by a remotely detonated car bomb. Then, on 23 October, the BLT Headquarters building was destroyed by a truck bomb. Almost simultaneously, the French MNF HQ was attacked by a similar truck bomb.

The USMNF was reinforced and remained in Lebanon, but increasingly the public and

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Congress began to question the continued effectiveness of what now had become not true peacekeeping, but direct military support to the GOL. The pattern of MNF military activities increasingly shifted from attempts to influence the situation to passive and protective self-defense and abandoned visibility and active patrolling. Direct U.S. and French military activities continued, including shore based and naval gunfire counter-battery fire defense of the MNF contingents and retaliatory air strikes against a terrorist base camp and Syrian artillery positions in November and December.

Reconciliation negotiations remained at an impasse throughout the period from November through February. Confessional fighting continued and intensified, as did occasional attacks against MNF forces. The LAF continued losing ground until their area of control was limited to west Beirut. "By February 1984, liaison and transport for the MNF contingents was becoming increasingly difficult and the political situation hopeless. On 6/7 February all ambassadors from the contingent countries received letters from the GOL notifying them that the safety of the MNF could no longer be ensured and requesting them to redeploy to safer locations."(7) They withdrew separately between 8 February and 31 March, and the MNF effort in Lebanon was over.

Lebanon at the Operational Level - Application of Concepts and Principles

The strategic goals and mission for this military "peacekeeping" operation were translated, through the chain of command, into the specific operational military mission, concept of operations and objectives for the USMNF. As it was planned and executed how were operational concepts and principles of war applied? Could they have been employed better, and if so, would that have contributed to enhanced mission success?

Objective is normally listed first among the principles of war, because it frames the question from which all subsequent decisions concerning application of other concepts and principles are made - what are we trying to do? In general, the principle is that military operations, at every level, should be directed toward clearly defined, decisive and attainable objectives derived from the strategic political aim as defined by the NCA, the command's mission, the means available, the characteristics of the enemy and the characteristics of the area of operations.

The chain of command for the USMNF in Lebanon ran from the President and NCA, advised by the JCS, to USCINCEUR. The mission statement provided to USCINCEUR by the JCS Alert Order of 23 September 1983 was:

"To establish an environment which will permit the Lebanese Armed Forces
to carry out their responsibilities in the Beirut area. When directed, USCINCEUR
will introduce U.S. forces as part of a multinational force *presence* (italics added)

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in the Beirut area to occupy and secure positions along a designated section of the line from south of the Beirut International Airport to a position in the vicinity of the Presidential Palace; be prepared to protect U.S. forces; and, on order, conduct retrograde operations as required." The USMNF would not be engaged in combat. Peacetime rules of engagement would apply in that use of force was authorized only in self defense or in defense of collocated LAF elements operating with the USMNF. Finally, USCINCEUR would be prepared to extract U.S. forces if required by hostile action. (8)

USCINCEUR repromulgated the mission statement, essentially unchanged, to CINCUSNAVEUR, the next rung in the theater operational chain of command, on 24 September 1982. The message designated Commander Amphibious Task Force 61 (at that time Commander, Amphibious Squadron Eight), subordinate to COMSIXTHFLT, as Commander, U.S. Forces in Lebanon. It also included a concept of operations which provided more specific objectives, tasking CINCUSNAVEUR to:

"employ Navy/Marine forces to . . . land U.S. Marine Landing Force in the port of Beirut or vicinity Beirut International Airport [and] move to occupy positions along an assigned section of a line extending from south of Beirut International Airport to vicinity of the Presidential Palace. Provide security posts at intersections of assigned section of line and major approaches into city off Beirut from south/southeast to assist LAF to deter passage of hostile armed elements in order to provide an environment which will permit LAF to carry out their responsibilities in city of Beirut. Commander, U.S. Forces will establish and maintain continuous coordination with other MNF units, EUCOM liaison team and LAF . . . provide naval gunfire support as required . . . conduct combined defensive operations with other MNF contingents and the LAF. . . and be prepared to conduct retrograde or withdrawal operations as required." (9)

The message also included tasking for other component commands and supporting CINCs.

Although some operational details were added, the original mission statement and the USCINCEUR concept of operations, was further repromulgated down the chain of command essentially unchanged, with no additional specificity or amplification concerning objectives. CINCUSNAVEUR provided position locations for the USMNF ashore, COMSIXTHFLT further defined the chain of command by designating the Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) commander (CTF 62) as both commander U.S. Forces Ashore Lebanon and Commander USMNF, as well as tasking the Commander Carrier Striking Forces Mediterranean (CTF 60) to provide support. CTF 61 added the operational procedures for ship-to-shore movement, and CTF 62 the detailed movement plan and concept of operations for the first three days ashore. It was only at the level of the CTF 62, the commander US Forces Ashore, that specificity of objectives was further refined.

One of requirements of the principle of objective is that each commander must clearly communicate intent, missions and objectives to their subordinates. The DOD commission found that, because of the lack of amplification and specificity in the mission statement,

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concept of operations, and objectives "perceptual differences as to the precise . . . role of the USMNF existed throughout the chain of command." "The mission of the USMNF was *implicitly* characterized as peacekeeping, although this was not explicit in any of the mission definitions". Statements and reports from from senior officials, including the President, "conveyed a strong impression of the peacekeeping nature of the operation, [and] the subject lines of the JCS Alert and Execute orders read "US Force Participation in Lebanon Multinational Force (MNF) Peacekeeping Operations."(10) There seems to have been little exchange of views up or down the chain of command to better define the meaning and purpose of the mission, or what objectives were appropriate.

These perceptual differences and lack of coordination caused questions about and difficulty in framing precise military objectives at the operational level. It also affected numerous decisions made during the course of the operation concerning the disposition and employment of the USMNF and its supporting forces. The MAU commanders interpreted their "presence" and peacekeeping mission to require the USMNF be highly visible, particularly in demonstrating support for the GOL, but not appear threatening. This concern was a factor in most decisions concerning the employment and disposition of their forces, particularly assessment of the effect of contemplated security actions.

Another concern in formulating objectives was the importance of BIA. None of the mission statements specifically delineated the requirement for the USMNF to ensure its operations, let alone at what level of security or show of outward force. Yet the implicit mission was perceived. U.S. political representatives, from the president down to the ambassador, expressed the view that part of the Marine's mission was to ensure the airport remained operational. Representatives of the other MNF commands, and particularly the GOL, also believed an operational airport was important to the viability of the MNF concept and the continued popular legitimacy of the government. USMNF commanders all conducted their activities with one of their objectives as ensuring not only that the airport remained operational, but that those operations sustained an appearance of normalcy. It was therefore determined that the USMNF positions at BIA emphasize visibility and non-treatening appearance over security.

Definition of appropriate objectives depends not only on clarity of understanding of mission, but accurate analysis of the characteristics of the enemy and area of operations. It was assumed in both mission definition and planning that the USMNF would operate in a relatively benign environment. The major threats were expected to be from unexploded ordnance and from random small arms or light mortar attacks by radical terrorists or uncontrolled militia elements. Because the threat was assumed to be low, the environment relatively benign, and the mission diplomatic instead of tactical, it was determined the

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Battalion Landing Team (BLT) and the MSSG it had already requested and received, including combat engineer, interrogator/translator, explosive ordnance disposal, public affairs, preventive medicine, ANGLICO, and intelligence detachments, were sufficient to accomplish the mission.(11)

Perhaps none of these factors would have become critical had the environment remained essentially benign, as it did up until at least March, and perhaps even April of 1983, when the U.S. embassy was truck-bombed. Both political and military conditions also changed radically in May when Israel and Lebanon signed the separate withdrawal agreement. From that point on, as fighting escalated and the LAF became seen as pro-Christian and Pro-Israeli, the position of the MNF began to be jeopardized. When the political decision was made in September to provide direct artillery and Naval gunfire support to the LAF, it could be argued that the USMNF was no longer functioning in a non-combatant or peacekeeping role, but in one of peacemaking or nation support. The emphasis had shifted from the implicit peacekeeping part of the mission to the explicit requirement to support the GOL, and "by the end of September, the situation in Lebanon had changed to the extent that not one of the conditions upon which the mission statement was premised was still valid. . . The image of the USMNF, in the eyes of the factional militias, had become pro-Israel, pro-Phalange and anti-Muslim . . . [and] a significant portion of the populace no longer considered [it] a neutral force."(12)

This was a political decision, but included in the principle of objective is the admonition that they be constantly analyzed and reviewed to accurately reflect both the ultimate political purpose and the constraints imposed on the application of military force. Also, in addition to one's own objectives, some understanding of the objectives of adversaries is necessary. It was the responsibility of the military chain of command to assess the consequences of the change in the situation in Lebanon, and clarify those consequences through adjustments in the military mission, concept of operations and objectives.

The problem was that no significant, adequate review or alteration of the missions and objectives of the USMNF was conducted at any level in the chain of command, from CINCEUR to the MAU commander. The the mission and concept of operations statements for the USMNF commander were not changed to reflect the realities of the situation, and no guidance or modification relative to tasking or objectives was provided. The USMNF, though recognizing the changed situation, was still operating with emphasis toward providing a non-threatening and neutral presence, as required by its implicit mission of peacekeeping and explicit mission of visible presence to demonstrate political support for the GOL. This framing of objectives led to the decisions concerning ROE and security at BIA which contributed to the success of the truck bomb attack.

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To some extent, these difficulties were a function of the *command organization* for the MNF operation. The U.S. chain of command was long and complex, running from the NCA to USCINCEUR, then in theater via CINCUSNAVEUR and COMSIX THFLT to CTF-61, the Phibron commanders, who were designated as the overall commanders of U.S. Forces in Lebanon. Under them were the MAU commanders, who were designated commanders of U.S Forces Ashore Lebanon. In addition, the commanders of CTF-60, the Carrier Striking Forces, provided significant support to the effort, but were not operationally subordinate to the commanders U.S. forces in Lebanon, even when operating in direct support of USMNF.

The first effect of this organization was that questions concerning missions and objectives, and their refinement, had to travel through several layers of command, each with its own interpretation. Another was the length of time it took to exchange information on rules of engagement, and most other operational information between the CINC and the commander on the ground, and the variations of interpretation of both requests and orders which inevitably took place as they passed through the levels in between. A third appeared to be that CINCEUR, assuming that at each step his subordinates were taking appropriate actions, never felt it necessary to verify that each level sufficiently understood its own role and the intent of instructions.

The basic underlying premise of the principle of *Unity of Command* is unity of effort. The direction and coordination of the efforts of *all* forces should be *focused* toward the common goals and objectives, and this can best be accomplished by vesting one commander with responsibility and authority for doing so. The question is who was the operational commander for the USMNF operation? Who was responsible for interpreting strategic goals into clearly defined operational missions, goals and objectives, and for focusing the effort? The length of the chain of command between the CINC and the on-scene commanders made this determination difficult. CTF 61 was the commander of U.S. Forces in Lebanon. However, with all the intervening levels between he and the CINC there were difficulties in clarifying responsibility and authority for changing the mission emphasis or objectives.

Within the USMNF command structure, perhaps this could have been avoided by having a single operational commander for the USMNF directly subordinate to CINCEUR, with operational control over all forces directly involved. This commander could than have focused his attention on the situation, recognized changing circumstances, coordinated the views of his tactical commanders and made concise recommendations directly to the CINC which might have avoided lapses in adjustment of operations.

However, the overall operation was combined. The principle of unity of command recommends that if a single commander is not possible, such as in some combined operations, measures must be taken to ensure close command coordination, cooperation and

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agreement on common goals to achieve unity of effort. MNF II was organized in a federal manner. The U.S., French and Italian contingents each functioned within their own zones, under their own headquarters, responsive to their own national command structures and using their own logistic systems, as did the LAF. There was a joint Military Committee which met daily, chaired by the LAF G-3 and including representatives of each MNF contingent and the LAF General Staff. There was no IDF representation. All contacts with the IDF were coordinated through the GOL or independent diplomatic channels.

This arrangement could have worked. Unfortunately, "the Military Committee "functioned as no more than a conduit for the flow of information, rather than as a central point for coordinating military activities."(13) There was no combined staff in a single centralized headquarters planning and overseeing military activities in any coherent campaign plan based on common goals using the combined capabilities of all the contingents. There was also a Political Committee, consisting of the ambassadors and contingent commanders, which met weekly or as necessary under a Lebanese chairman. Once again, however, there was no strong single voice within the committee to clearly defined common political goals or imperatives which could guide military action.

Simplicity is related to both objective and unity of effort. The basic premise is that command relationships, objectives, operations guidance, plans and orders should be as simple   d direct as circumstances allow. This prevents misunderstanding and confusion, contributing to unity of effort. Simplicity also promotes flexibility by allowing initiative at lower operational/tactical levels within clear and well understood guidelines. Unity of command in turn promotes simplicity by vesting responsibility for definition of objectives, preparation of plans, and issuance of intent, guidance and orders in a single entity.

It should be apparent from the previous discussion that this principle was not well applied in the MNF operation. The command relationships, plans and orders were not simple or clearly understood. Even at the tactical level simplicity was violated in one key instance. The MAU commander instituted two sets of ROE for his forces, one for the detachments guarding the embassy facilities which allowed chambered rounds and preemptive self defense against approaching suspect vehicles and another for the guards at the BIA and BLT HQ posts which did not. This even though CINCEUR had thought his intent that the more aggressive ROE could apply to all USMNF forces was clear. Lack of simplicity in the chain of command and clarity in the prioritization of objectives may have contributed to this misunderstanding.

The principle of *Offensive* suggests that the seizure, maintenance and exploitation of the initiative is the most effective way to attain a clearly defined common goal at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. Offensive action, in whatever form it might take, is the means by which a nation or military force captures and holds the initiative, maintains freedom of action, and achieves results. It permits political and military leaders to set the terms and select the time and place of confrontation, exploit vulnerabilities, and react to rapidly changing circumstances. Even defense should be active rather than passive. No matter what the level, the idea to force the adversary, not yourself, to react rather than act.

It be may difficult to envision potential applications of offensive to the MNF peacekeeping operations, at least at the operational level. Since in peacekeeping there is no adversary, what does one take the offensive against? The maintenance of the initiative at the strategic-political level in peacekeeping might involve using the political and diplomatic influence, including the enlistment of international pressure, to actively encourage agreement between belligerents who may be reluctant to do so.

In the case of Lebanon it is apparent that the strategic political initiative was lost, even though considerable effort was devoted to it. The problem was two fold. The interim GOL, though it was initially given a chance to succeed, became aligned politically with Israel by entering into a separate agreement on withdrawal. This was partially due to the influence of the U.S. One of the long term U.S. goals in Lebanon was security for Israel, as well as withdrawal of all foreign forces. The U.S., with its direct sponsorship of negotiations, pushed for approval of the Israeli-GOL agreement without obtaining the concurrence of Syria, which was not even included at the table. This was a major strategic error if real agreement was to be reached. This was compounded by the fact that the overall position and interests of the U.S. in the Middle East could not be divorced from its involvement in Lebanon. The combination of these two factors effectively doomed the diplomatic offensive.

At the military-operational level in peacekeeping, the capability to gain and retain initiative may depend on initial and continued political-diplomatic agreement on the terms of the force's mandate. If this fails, then any other measures taken at the operational level to maintain offensive spirit and freedom of action - to act rather than react - may prove to be in vain. This was probably the case in Lebanon.

However, before the strategic initiative was lost, there were also measures which could have been employed to gain and maintain initiative at the operational level. Some were employed fairly well by the USMNF, such as frequent and visible patrolling. Others, though they were certainly attempted, were not performed well enough in light of conditions, such as properly placed and sufficiently enforced checkpoints. Still others, though attempted, were not entirely successful for reasons having to do with local perceptions and prejudices, such as

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early development of local intelligence sources and information exchange mechanisms and active promotion of contacts to develop trust between the force and the belligerents. Others were eschewed because of perceived mission requirements, such as active measures to intervene equitably and effectively to mediate potential or actual military confrontations at the local level, and rapid proportional responses to attacks on MNF forces.

More aggressive actions by both the U.S. and the other MNF forces in response to fighting as it began to erupt around Beirut may have enhanced their overall effectiveness and prevented escalation. It was well known that U.S. patrols and posts did not have chambered rounds in their weapons, which eroded its respectability in the eyes of the militias. No self-defense actions were taken in response to artillery attacks against the USMNF until almost two months after they began to occur. Rapid response early may have reduced further instances. It also became quickly apparent that none of the MNF forces would move offensively to quell small scale militia fighting Beirut. Thus they were not discouraged from continuing the intermittent attacks which eventually escalated to full scale fighting.

After the Israeli withdrawal, it might be argued the USMNF might have proceeded to occupy the positions in the Shouf hills above BIA which were denied to it earlier in order to prevent the impression it was protecting the Israeli supply route along the Sidon road. Additional forces might have been needed to do so, but an offensive-minded commander could have requested, and may received them considering the political capital the U.S. government was putting into Lebanon. This was in fact considered, but it was not done. Perhaps it could have enhanced security and prevented some of the artillery attacks which caused casualties and led to troops being concentrated in the BLT HQ building. It also might be argued that aggressive reinforcement of checkpoints and positions (not just during threat alerts), and adjusted rules of engagement for the entire USMNF (not just the detachments guarding the British embassy) following the embassy bombing could have reduced the likelihood of successful terrorist attacks.

None of these actions would have specifically violated the constraints imposed on the MNF. But none of them were undertaken because their role was viewed as defensive rather than offensive, and the defense was passive.

The principle of *Culminating Points* relates to offensive. In warfare it implies that every offensive, unless it is strategically decisive, will reach a point where the strength of the attacker no longer exceeds that of the defender. Beyond that point the attacker risks overextension, counterattack and defeat. The attacker seeks to reach decisive objectives before the culminating point is reached, and attempts to design his attack to do so. The defender seeks to exhaust the attacker before he reaches a decisive objective. The important

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point is that the attacker must realize when he is about to reach the culminating point, and revert to the defense. The defender must recognize when his opponent has reached his culminating point, and be prepared to take the offensive before he can recover.

Does this apply to peacekeeping? Can it be applied in the case of Lebanon? To do effectively requires a somewhat broader view of the concept. In Lebanon, the culminating point of the operation probably occurred when the USMNF lost its neutrality. The reasons for this were political-strategic, not military-operational. However, from that point forward, the military operation was no longer non-combatant and no longer peacekeeping. As a result, different operational priorities were necessary, with operational dispositions emphasizing strength and active defense rather than visible presence and non-threatening posture. This may also be the case in other peacekeeping operations, or other multifaceted LIC operations, in the future. Missions and conditions change, and operational commanders must be alert that their actions - offensive or defensive are appropriate.

The key in Lebanon was for the entire chain of command, from the NCA to the BLT, to recognize that the culminating point for the peacekeeping aspects of the operations had been reached, and for the mission and objectives to be adjusted accordingly. Arguably, this was not the case, for reasons already indicated. Had the theater and operational commanders been thinking of it in terms of this principle however, the realization just might have come.

Centers of Gravity are the most vital characteristics, capabilities or localities from which a force, nation or group derives its freedom of action, strength and will to fight. As with objective, the concept of centers of gravity can be applied at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. However, it is most often associated with the operational and strategic levels, where the requirement for synchronization of various elements of complex operations can increase the number of key factors on which success depends and expose weaknesses which can be exploited. The identification of enemy and friendly centers of gravity, and the identification of objectives and design of actions to expose the adversary's while protecting one's own, is often described as the essence of the operational art.

How can centers of gravity be employed in peacekeeping, where there is no "enemy" except the resumption of hostilities. In particular, how could its employment have been useful in Lebanon? The key might be to focus not on identifying and exposing enemy centers of gravity, but protecting one's own. If a peacekeeping force is to be effective, it must clearly identify and take measures to protect its *own* centers of gravity.

For the USMNF, what was that center of gravity, that vital characteristic on which its success depended? This depends on objectives. The overall objective of the MNF's was to create an atmosphere of stability so that the GOL and LAF could have the opportunity to

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establish authority and security in Beirut. To do so, they had to maintain their own neutrality and force integrity. Unfortunately, in this situation, as perhaps it may in other peacekeeping situations, neutrality depended on political factors. The only actions the MNF's could take to protect it was to remain within their ROE and apply a balanced approach. Only the Italian contingent succeeded in doing so. Both the U.S. and French contingents, or their supporting forces, violated that neutrality by political direction.

One other center of gravity for the USMNF was the force itself. If the force could be attacked with significant casualties, both its will to aggressively continue operations in support of the LAF and the political will of the United States to leave it in place long enough to produce the desired political solution might be broken. It is the contention of many that the USMNF did not pursue protection of its own force aggressively enough, particularly by unnecessarily concentrating too much of its force in a single, poorly secured building. This was due to both the perception (or misperception) of mission priorities already discussed, and the assessment that the threat of casualties from artillery was higher than the likelihood of terrorist attack. The indicators of high terrorist threat were certainly present, but apparently not clearly defined enough to cause a reassessment of disposition by the operational commanders. This may have been a fault of intelligence dissemination. Whatever the case, would more focus on centers of gravity have improved the thought processes which resulted in the BLT disposition? It is extremely hard to say.

Security is the minimization of vulnerability to hostile acts or influence. It results from active or passive measures taken as protection from intelligence collection, observation, detection, interference, espionage, sabotage or annoyance which could result in adversaries gaining unexpected advantage or achieving surprise. Effective application of such measures requires thorough knowledge of enemy goals, strategy, and capabilities. Security can also be enhanced through deception operations designed to diffuse attempts to interfere. It is related to centers of gravity, in that one's own should receive priority.

Certainly security was considered by the USMNF. Attempts were made to develop human intelligence sources and intelligence sharing among the contingents and LAF. These were recognized to be tenuous because the USMNF was never sure if all information was being shared. Patrol times and routes were varied to prevent exploitation of patterns by potential terrorist attackers, and posts reinforced during times when intelligence indicated an increased threat level. Positions were reinforced and dug in as the threat from artillery and mortar attacks increased, and TARPS, recon teams, and theater/national assets employed for reconnaissance.

However, as stated earlier, there were competing threats and capabilities to weigh, as

well as competing mission priorities. Perhaps the greatest shortfall was the lack of thorough knowledge, or perhaps sufficient appreciation, of the goals of certain groups to attack the US presence directly; and their capabilities for doing so with terrorist type tactics, particularly enhanced explosives in large quantities carried by large vehicles.

Surprise is to some degree the reciprocal of security. In warfare it implies that one should attempt to strike the enemy at times and places, and in manners for which, they are unaware or unprepared. This prevents them from becoming aware of one's actions soon enough to react effectively, and can create results disproportionate to the effort expended. Concealing ones own intentions and movements through security measures is one way to achieve surprise. Another is effective, rapid maneuver employing an offensive spirit. Surprise also requires effective intelligence to know the enemies dispositions, capabilities and intentions so they can be exploited.

Surprise in peacekeeping is again problematic. Should movements be concealed when one of the main goals is to provide a visible supporting or deterrent presence? Is it not important for the belligerents to know the intentions of the peacekeepers, as well as their general locations? These points are probably valid in most peacekeeping situations. However, they do not completely obviate surprise.

Surprise was not a particularly strong factor in the operations of the USMNF. The primary concern was to remain a visible presence. However, surprise was to employed to some extent, in that patrols were conducted at varying times. Varying patrols within generally agreed areas in peacekeeping operations may prevent potential clashes and complicate any plans belligerents may have to resume hostilities, but it is doubtful this was the primary intent of the USMNF. Another potential use of surprise, and maneuver, in peacekeeping situations is when effective intelligence can allow unanticipated preemptive deployment of sufficient force to potential trouble spots and prevent clashes from taking place. There is no evidence of this potential application being used in Lebanon.

The principle of *Mass* basically states that the preponderance of power (superior combat power in the warfare context) should be concentrated toward the most vital objectives, at decisive times and places, to achieve decisive results. It is related to various other principles in that superiority results from proper combination and concentration of the elements power at the time, place and manner of the commander's choosing in order to gain and hold the initiative. The corollary to mass is *Economy of Force*, which postulates the requirement to allocate minimum power and effort to secondary efforts. This requires clear understanding of objectives, astute analysis of potential threats and centers of gravity, careful

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planning, and acceptance of prudent risks in selected areas.

In the strategic context, the USMNF operations can probably be considered an economy of force operation. Even though the strategic goals were important, and the operation highly visible, within the theater context the level of effort applied pales in comparison to what remained devoted against the Soviet threat in Europe itself. The question which arises is whether the proper type and level of military power was dedicated to the effort in Lebanon at the proper times and places, and whether flexibility of thought and action applied to these decisions.

The use of the available MARG/MAU was an obvious choice for immediate reaction to the situation. There was limited time available, they had been there before, were in theater, and were easily mobile and supportable. As the deployment was being planned, the MAU requested additional support assets it believed were needed to cope with the situation as they knew it. They also considered whether the force was adequate for the situation and determined it was. The theater commander sent supporting forces and liaison elements to the scene as well. These were all appropriate actions.

However, the MNF II operation lasted more than a year. Was the single BLT and its supporting forces appropriate over the long term? It has been suggested that the Marines were not appropriate for a peacekeeping operation in this situation over the long term, since they consider themselves a fighting force and their temperament, training, appearance and actions may have exacerbated the situation.(14) Perhaps other elements from within CINCEUR or from CONUS could have been deployed, such as army military police and civil affairs units, and either replaced or augmented the Marines. There was certainly time to do so. MAUs changed twice during the course of the operation. There is also the opinion, expressed earlier, that the BLT could have been reinforced to occupy the Shouf as the IDF withdrew.

These are all valid points. It appears possible that more flexibility of thought and consideration of the principle of mass, if applied to MNF II, could have improved the level of mission success. The potential for application in other peacekeeping situations also exists. In either case it was and is the place of the operational commanders, both on the scene and at the theater level to consider these factors and make appropriate recommendations.

Maneuver will be considered last, but not because it is the least appropriate principle. In the context of warfare it is the means to place and keep the enemy at a disadvantage. This involves flexible application of combat power - the mobility, concentration and dispersal of force - to focus on the enemy's weakest points, act faster than he can react, and achieve decisive results. Perhaps the dimension of maneuver most appropriate to the situation in

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Lebanon is the need for flexibility in thought, plans and operations. This enhances the ability to react rapidly to unforeseen or changing circumstances. This applies at the theater level, where mobility can be used to have appropriate forces at appropriate places and times, and also at the operational level to set the terms of engagement.

One of the primary criticisms of the USMNF effort was failure to adapt to the changing environment and changing mission priorities. Had the principle of maneuver, particularly flexibility in thought, plans and operations been considered and applied to the situation, perhaps the implications of changing conditions on the mission and objectives could have been realized earlier. Appropriate changes to missions, objectives, and force composition and employment could then have been implemented more quickly and effectively in response. Maybe this would have helped to avoid some of the military setbacks suffered.

Concepts, Principles and Lebanon - Conclusions

Nothing in this analysis of the potential application of the principles of war in Lebanon is intended to indict those who were involved, or to assign blame for particular events, let alone the overall failure of the peacekeeping effort. Perhaps nothing the military could have done in Lebanon, short of full scale invasion and occupation followed by reconstitution of the state, could have changed the political circumstances which resulted in failure of the peace effort. This was not an operational military failure, but a strategic political one.

What has been attempted is to demonstrate how application of operational concept and principles might have contributed to more effective consideration of the use of the military instrument in this situation. Use of this framework for thinking might have assisted military commanders in evaluating the relationship of their mission to the overall peace effort, resulting in more thorough consideration of military requirements. Its emphasis on flexibility and continued analysis - intended to assist in the planning and conduct of synchronized campaigns and operations - may also have contributed to considered evaluation about how to adapt the use of the military instrument to the changing political circumstances. This might have been particularly useful when events shifted the priority of the USMNF's competing operational objectives from peacekeeping to peacemaking.

CHAPTER IV
GENERALIZATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

The MNF experience in Lebanon was a unique situation. The concepts and principles of war may have proven of some utility there, but would they also be useful in considering the application of the military instrument in peacekeeping operations generally?

From the experience of Lebanon it is apparent that peacekeeping operations, though they have some unique aspects; such as the requirements for a consent of belligerent parties, a clear mandate which circumscribes the scope of military application, balanced neutrality, and use of force only in self-defense; are still applications of the military instrument to assist in the achievement of strategic goals. In this respect they are not all that different from the use of military forces in war. Many of the requirements which apply to the use of the military instrument throughout the spectrum of conflict; such as subordination of military to political requirements, synchronization of military and political goals, and coordinated use of the military with the other tools of national power; still apply. What is different about peacekeeping is that these requirements may be even more critical to success.

None of the unique aspects of peacekeeping make the employment of the operational concepts and principles of war inappropriate to consideration of the proper use of the military in it. In fact some of them may be more vital in peacekeeping than in war. For example, the importance of proper application of the principle of objective is readily apparent. Because peacekeeping operations are so closely intertwined with political and diplomatic instruments, the need for clarity of political purpose and military objectives throughout the chain of command is perhaps more important than in war or other types of low intensity conflict. Misunderstanding of mission and intent can easily lead to mismatches of political and military objectives which might prove fatal.

Unity of command and effort can be crucial to peacekeeping, because close coordination of the military effort with other instruments of national power, clear understanding of goals, objectives and restrictions throughout the chain of command, and synchronization of many different traditional and non-traditional aspects of military operations are needed for success. Simplicity in command relationships allows rapid communication and coordination between military and diplomatic efforts, as well as precise understanding of the terms under which the peacekeeping force is operating. Restrictions and rules of engagement need to be simple and consistent. Guidance concerning coordination of various types of operations and how they each contribute to attainment of objectives must be well conceived and clearly laid out. Simple and understandable objectives, at all levels, are essential to obtaining and maintaining public support.

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One of the particular lessons of Lebanon is that peacekeeping operations may not always be what they seem. Most situations where peacekeeping forces might be employed are likely to be extremely volatile and tense. The environment may quickly change from one of acceptance and negotiation to one of hostility and renewed violence. In complex situations, military missions in what are broadly characterized as peacekeeping operations may include many things other than keeping the peace. In assessing such situations and the way to best employ military forces in them, use of operational design concepts and principles of war might prove an extremely useful framework, possibly preventing surprises and revealing alternatives or opportunities.

Clear identification and protection of one's own centers of of gravity can promote effectiveness by thoughtful application of measures to prevent them from being unbalanced, causing reduced freedom of action or loss of will. In addition, while military success may not directly lead to peace without political success, military failure may directly contribute to failure if unacceptable casualties result from not protecting centers of gravity.

The maintenance of the initiative at the strategic-political level using the political and diplomatic instruments is key to overall success and management of the entire peacekeeping situation. For the operational commander, even though combat action may be circumscribed, offensive actions of other appropriate types are possible. Their development, implementation and maintenance may prove helpful by preventing potential escalation or preempting threats to the force. Mass, economy of force and maneuver can be employed by the theater and operation commanders to consider the proper mix of forces, as well as to retain flexibility of thought and action in response to changing circumstances.

The bottom line is that peacekeeping is a military operation, and over time perhaps even could be characterized as a campaign - with changing circumstances, changing objectives, branches and sequels. An operational approach; which includes consideration and use of operational design concepts, operational planning methods and the principles of war; if done with an open mind and a broad view, can be as applicable to each unique peacekeeping situation as it can be to each unique conflict.

NOTES

CHAPTER II

1. For official defintions of peacekeeping operations see Joint Chiefs of Staff; JCS Pub 3-07, Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low Intensity Conflict; (Initial Draft) May,1989, pp IV-1-4; and Departments of the Army and Air Force; Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict; Field Manual 100-20, Air Force Pamphlet 3-20; U.S. Gov't Printing Office, Washington, 1990, pp 1-7 and 4-1. Other discussions and definitions of the requirements for deployment of peacekeeping forces can be found in Diehl, Paul F. "Avoiding Another Beirut Disaster: Strategies for Employment of U.S. Forces in Peacekeeping Roles" Conflict Vol. 8, No. 4, 1988; pp. 261-270; and Allen, John R., Capt USMC "Peacekeeping and Local Presence Missions: Capabilities and Challenges" Defense Science 2003+ Vol 4 No 6, Dec1985-Jan 1986 ; pp.54-62 and Vol 5, No 1, Feb-Mar 1986; pp. 51-65.

2. JCS Pub 3-07; p IV-1.

3. Ibid, p. V-1 and FM 110-20 / AFP 3-20; p. 5-7.

4. Ibid; p. V-13.

5. All definitions of the principles of war and concepts of operational design are dirivied directly from Joint Chiefs of Staff; JCS Test Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations; January 1990, appendix A and Glossary Part II; and from Department of the Army: FM 100-5 Operations, U.S. Gov't Printing Office, Washington, May 1986, Appendices A and B.

6. Quoted from FM 100-1 The Army in Summers, Harry Jr., LtCol USA "Principles of War and Low Intesity Conflict" Military Review Vol. 65, No. 3, March 1985; p. 44.

7. FM 100-5 Operations; p. 180.

8. Diehl, Paul F. "When Peacekeeping Does Not Lead to Peace" Bulletin of Peace Proposals Vol. 18, No. 1, pp 47 and 50.

CHAPTER III

1. Frank, Benis M. U.S. Marines in Lebanon 1982-1984; History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Gov't Printing Office, Washington, 1987; p.22. (Hereafter; Frank)

2. U.S. strategic goals are described in: Murphy, Richard, ASD Near East and South Asian Affairs "U.S. Interests in Lebanon" Department of State Bulletin, U.S. Govt Printing Office, March 1984; p.54; Shultz, George, Secretary of State "U.S. Objectives in Lebanon" Department of State Bulletin, U.S. Gov't Printing Office, November 1983; p.44; and Shultz, George, Secretary of State "The Situation in Lebanon" Department of State Bulletin, U.S. Gov Printing Office, December 1983; pp. 25

3. See Depart ment of State Bulletin, Dec 1983; Statement by Jonathan Howe, Director of Politcal-Military Affairs, U.S. Dept of State, testimony before the House Armed Services Commmittee Nov 1, 1983 (p.46) and reprint of White House Statement of Oct 23, 1983 (p.41).

4. MacKinlay, John "MNF2 in Beirut: Some Military Lessons for Peacekeepers" Conflict Quarterly Vol. IV, No. 4, Fall 1986; p 19. (hereafter MacKinlay)

5. Ibid; p 18.

6. MacKinlay; p.19

7. Ibid ; p.18

8. Department of Defense, United States; Report of the DOD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983; U.S. Gov't Printing Office, Washington, 1983; pp 35-36. (Hereafter DOD Commission).

9. Ibid; p.36

10. Ibid; p.38

11. Ibid; p.39

12. Ibid: p.40 and 41

13. Frank; p. 31

14. See MacKinlay; p.22, 23; and Calgaris, Luigi "Western Peacekeeping Forces in Lebanon: Lessons of the MNF" Survival; Vol. 26, No. 6 , Nov-Dec 1984; p 263 .

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